Analiza je revija za analitično filozofijo, ki poudarja racionalni, argumentativni pristop k filozofskim problemom tako s teoretičnega kot praktičnega področja. V uvodniku prve številke, ki je izšla leta 1997, je takratno uredništvo prepoznalo tri razloge, ki so govorili v prid taki reviji. Prvič, omogočala naj bi nadaljnji razvoj analitične filozofije v Sloveniji. Drugič, domači publiki naj bi predstavljala svetovne domete analitične filozofije in pa domačo ustvarjanje. Tretjič, z razvijanjem slovenske terminologije in z zastavljanjem vprašanj ter iskanjem odgovorov, ki imajo izvor v tu in sedaj, naj bi skrbela za razvoj slovenske identitete. Ti razlogi so relevantni še danes, se je pa skozi čas pokazalo, da ta vprašanja niso le filozofsko relevantna, temveč imajo širši domet. Revija je tako danes širše orientirana in objavlja članke, ki so zanimivi tudi za »nefilozofsko« publiko, predvsem članke s širšo kulturno vsebino (multikulturalizem, akulturacija, asimilacija, problem pravic kulturnih manjšin itn.) in članke s področja teorije umetnosti. Revija se na reflektiran in kritičen način ukvarja tudi z aktualnimi problemi, ki tarejo našo družbo (etična problematika, problem migracij, politična filozofija, socialni problemi družbe, izobraževanje itn.). V prihodnosti bomo še večjo pozornost posvetili filozofskim vprašanjem, ki jih odpirajo raziskovanja v sodobni kognitivni znanosti (npr. etične in družbene implikacije nevroznanosti in umetne inteligence).
Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti
The article compares Illich’s and Rawls’s understanding of the role of institutions in shaping a just social order and ensuring individual autonomy. Rawls regards social institutions as the essential foundation of a just and stable societal structure, while Illich highlights their limitations, particularly concerning legitimacy and political, ideological, and economic neutrality. According to Illich, institutions can threaten individual freedom when they shift from being the means for achieving goals to becoming ends in themselves. As an alternative, he proposes a convivial community that rejects tools – namely systems, technologies, and institutions – that could degenerate into mechanisms of control or restrictions on freedom. However, even this solution is not without risks, as it may fall into the same problems as institutions by adopting certain forms of control and restriction characteristic of traditional communities. Despite these limitations, Illich’s critique underscores the need for institutional reform to ensure that they truly serve the protection of individual freedom and autonomy.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.153-166.2024
What Can We Really Say About Fictional Characters?
The article discusses how the theory of pretense and the artefactual theory of fiction work in internal and external talk about fiction, and why both fictional anti-realism and realism run into difficulties. It presents Amie Thomasson's (2003b) solution, which preserves the existence of fictional characters as abstract artefacts, but still adopts pretense into the intrafictional discourse to resolve the ambiguities that arise when using fictional names in different contexts. The problematic nature of de re pretense, which requires pretending that an abstract object has concrete properties, is highlighted. If we reject de re pretense and accept de dicto pretense in the fictional discourse, we lose the uniformity of the theory and claim that fictional names refer in one part of the discourse but not in the other. The aim of this paper is to suggest that, although it requires a dual use of fictive names, the introduction of pretense into a realist theory of fiction does a better job of explaining our understanding of talk about fiction than anti-realist theories.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.169-186.2024
Modal Catapults and the Limits of Modal Logic
I explore modal “catapults,” a variety of closure principles for modal operators. Consider a proposition p that logically implies, entails, strictly implies, modally implies, materially implies, …, a proposition q. According to the appropriate catapult for a modal operator M, if Mp, then also Mq. Modal catapults play a crucial role in the logical analysis of traditional philosophical arguments, such as fatalism and incompatibilism. Additionally, standard deontic paradoxes and moral dilemmas involve a deontic modal catapult in some form. In the realm of deontic logic, I advocate for a solution grounded in actualism and counterfactuals (Jackson, Goble). In considering whether it ought to be that A we should look particularly at what would be the case, were A the case. This approach explains the failures of closure while still acknowledging its central role in modal reasoning. Modal catapults are indispensable to the logic of modalities, but they also delineate the boundaries of this approach.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.189-208.2024
The paper, motivated by the chapter in Šuster’s book, considers the aspect of the so-called Fitch’s ar-gument (FA) that seriously challenges the verificationist theory. Contrary to Šuster’s view, it is throughout the paper that I’m pursuing the idea that most of the attempts that intend to vindicate verifi-cationism from the grip of Fitch’s argument, including Edgington’s theory, fail in their intention. Con-cerning the attempts to mitigate the effect of Fitch’s argument to verificationism in the framework of classical logic (Eddington as the most important representative), I’m siding with their critics (William-son, Percival) and claim that they fail in their intention. Regarding the attempts to block the effect of Fitch’s argument in the framework of non-classical (intuitionistic, relevant, dialetheist, and so on) log-ic, they do it by introducing principles that invalidate some of the basic classical rules and principles, usually introducing trivial worlds. In that case, the verificationist principle (as well as all inferences included in Fitch’s argument) is vacuously valid, which seems to be unsatisfactory. In any case, there is no decisive evidence that either classical or any of the non-classical approaches can avail the verifi-cationist anything to escape out of the grip of FA.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.209-228.2024
I am discussing the concept of possible worlds as it is used in modal semantics, which Danilo Šuster also discusses in his book Modal Catapults. I wonder how to understand possible worlds in the talk of the non-existent, for example, in explicitly imaginary discourses. Only the context of the discussion, where modal propositions about virtual (irreal) entities or virtual (irreal) states of affairs appear but not a priori judgments about what is in principle logically possible or impossible, can establish a meaningful speech about relevant possible worlds. This raises several problems, e.g., interpreting statements that refer to both real and virtual entities, especially interpreting some counterfactuals about real and virtual entities. It seems that in some instances, we cannot “get rid” of counterfactuality, e.g., by semantic conversion into ordinary general sentences about possible worlds of a certain kind.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.229-238.2024
Despite our best efforts, we often fail to act in a perfectly rational manner. Recently, some epistemologists have suggested that we should admit our failings and develop a modest epistemology that would take our fallibility seriously. This includes accounting for the role of evidence of our irrationality, usually called higher-order evidence. It seems intuitive that modest reasoners should take such evidence into account. However, it turns out that incorporating higher-order evidence into a principled theory of what rationality requires is not an easy task. In this paper, I first review the debate about higher-order evidence, describing in detail the puzzle of higher-order evidence and the main positions about it in the literature. Then, I provide two novel examples of higher-order evidence, taken from science. I argue that these examples put pressure on the views that reject the role of higher-order evidence. These views commit themselves to the conclusion that some common scientific practices, such as evaluating evidence in systematic reviews or even running null hypothesis significance tests, are irrational.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.241-262.2024
Recently, informal epistemology has centred on a theory of epistemic virtues and vices, rooted in Aristotle's virtue ethics and divided into two key approaches: reliabilism and responsibilism, which offer related but contrasting views. Quassim Cassam's work has advanced the perception of vices as behaviours that prevent access to knowledge, classified by fidelity. The theory of epistemic virtues and vices has also led to the theory of argumentative virtues, notably developed by Andrew Aberdein, who examines the transmission of knowledge and belief through argumentation. Argumentative vices, by the same theory, are characteristics that lead to fallacious argumentation and acceptance of flawed arguments. However, Cohen argues that not all knowledge transfer – such as inferential statements or classroom conversation – is necessarily argumentative. Since belief transfer can occur non-argumentatively, it is reasonable to seek an argumentation-related vice in such cases. Grice's theory of implicatures suggests flawed statements generate pragmatic implications, creating space to examine epistemic vices in language within non-argumentative belief transfer contexts.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.285-310.2024
The Goals of Bounded Epistemic Rationality
Notions of rationality in epistemology are often based on idealised models of epistemic agents and the environment in which they are embedded. The concept of bounded epistemic rationality aims to avoid such idealizations and proposes norms of inquiry based on empirical data about the limitations of human cognition and the features of the epistemic environment. Drawing on Simon's work on bounded rationality, Gigerenzer's notion of ecological rationality, and McKenna's programme of non-ideal epistemology, it functions as a hybrid concept that contains both normative and descriptive elements and offers epistemic advice that helps to improve our epistemic position and achieve our epistemic goals. Traditionally, epistemic goals include forming true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs, justification, knowledge, and understanding. In this paper, I summarise selected aspects of the debate about epistemic values and goals, focusing on veritistic monism, and reflect on the goals of bounded epistemic rationality. I conclude that bounded epistemic strives towards various forms of cognitive success, not only towards the truth, but limits rational inquiry to questions relevant to the epistemic agent.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.263-284.2024
Between Sense and Meaning: In Relation to Frege, Can We Form an Alternative Way of Distinguishing Between Sense and Meaning?
How can one determine a difference between Sense and Meaning? Is there an alternative to the way of differentiation between Sense and Meaning as being used by one of the fathers of modern analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), whereby we think his well-known finding that »whereas the sense of the Morning and the Evening Star is different, their meaning is the same«? The organon that we developed comprises some descriptions of the thinking, bodily, and intuitive cogito. The differentiation among the inherent systems of organization and functioning of the three kinds of cogito shows that an alternative description of differentiation between the typical products of the thinking (sense) and the intuitive cogito (meaning) can be ascertained. This is a differentiation between Sense and Meaning that is different from the one in Frege.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.1.123-150.2024
Is Quine’s Problem of Indeterminacy Of Translation and Reference Relevant for Linguistic And Translation Theories?
The paper examines the concept of equivalence in translation theory, exploring its various interpretations and criticisms. It analyses different approaches to equivalence in the literature, including Catford's notion of equivalence, Nida and Taber's formal and dynamic equivalence, and Koller's five types of equivalence. The paper then considers critiques of equivalence, focusing on the critiques based on the influence of Quine's indeterminacy of translation and reference. It argues that while Quine's problem challenges the notion of meaningbased equivalence, other forms of equivalence remain viable, although accepting Quine's position necessitates the elimination of meaning itself. Finally, the paper weighs the implications of these different perspectives on translation theory. While accepting Quine's view challenges some forms of equivalence, it does not completely invalidate the concept. Other types of equivalence, such as those focused on function or effect, remain valid. However, accepting Quine's view requires eliminating the concept of meaning, which has profound implications for the field of translation studies and linguistics in general.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.1.103-122.2024
The Ontology of Dance Through the Lens of Plato’s Theory of Forms and Plato’s Evaluation of Dance
In this article we discuss the ontology of dance from the perspectives of Plato and contemporary authors. We begin by presenting various philosophical aspects of the concept of dance. This is followed by an analysis of the ontology of dance, where we draw on the thinking of the contemporary authors Osintseva and Pakes. The latter focuses (among other things) on the parallels between Platonism and the ontology of dance. In the following, we examine relevant Platonic ontology or Theory of Forms, which posits the existence of a suprasensible realm. The article addresses the issue of Plato's critique of art in The Republic, where he advocates for the exclusion of artists from the ideal state. Plato perceived art as imitation, which he argued had a negative influence on the population. These views seem inconsistent with his positive attitude towards art in elementary education. In ancient Greece, a person skilled in dance was considered educated. Plato incorporated the concept of harmony into his philosophy of music, a quality still regarded as one of the highest virtues in music and dance today. In conclusion, we compare ballet with Plato's Theory of Forms, revealing their similarities.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.1.77-100.2024
The Transcendent in the Cinematic Experience
Based on the theory of conceptual metaphors, we will introduce the idea of God and the divine as a concept, referring to how cinematic art depicts and treats spiritual or religious themes. In addition to mentioning traditional metaphors, we will focus on the idea of transcendence as an experience of transcending everyday perception and understanding of the world. We will explore the phenomenological relationship between immanence and transcendence, particularly in relation to how films attempt to depict the experience of ecstasy and otherness and to create experiences that transcend rational understanding. Since cinematic art does not depend solely on verbal expression but, to a large extent, on the sensual and emotional response of the viewer, it is of particular interest here because it manages to break through the boundaries of rational discourse and provide access to experiences usually associated with religion and spirituality. We will describe some possible strategies through which films evoke the meaning and sense of the transcendent in the living body of the viewer and examine how film becomes a means of expressing the ineffable – the (divine) reality that is beyond language.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.1.51-76.2024
The article pursues two goals: to provide a working definition of terrorism and to critically evaluate the argumentative strategies leading to its near-universal moral condemnation. The author advocates for a definition of terrorism tailored to the needs of moral evaluation: the indiscriminate use of violence—or the serious threat thereof— with the aim or purpose of coercing (authorities) into implementing more or less radical political or social changes. Regarding the second, the author acknowledges that terrorists, through deliberate, but indiscriminate physical and psychological violence, assume a heavy moral burden. However, the argument is made that terrorism is not significantly different in this respect from other forms of politically motivated violence that are generally tolerated or even celebrated and admired, such as armed uprisings, and wars. Whether terrorism ultimately collapses under this moral burden will depend on the concrete justification, interpretation, and application of the principle of civilian immunity—a task far more challenging upon reflection than its commonly assumed. Finally, there are no compelling reasons to equate terrorism with extremism, especially when one considers how much more lenient we are toward other forms of politically motivated violence, which are, at best, morally equivalent to terrorism and, at worst, inferior.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.1.3-50.2024
Status umetne inteligence v svetu umetnosti
The Status of Artificial Intelligence in the World of Art Today, we are witnessing a very rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) in practically all fields. The most widely known or notable development in the field of AI is the development of ChatGPT by OpenAI. ChatGPT is a tool which answers questions, and helps in writing texts, essays, and programming code with the help of AI. However, in recent years, another form of creative AI has been brought closer to the public, which, however, does not deal with language, but is artistically involved in the field of visual and other arts. Probably the most famous AI software for creating or generating visual art is DALL-E, which, like ChatGPT, is owned by OpenAI. In the article, we will touch upon the “problem” of introducing AI into the art world and what AI art represents to society in contrast to “normal” human art. We will mainly be interested in questions such as what AI art is, whether AI art can even be considered art, whether AI can be an artist in itself or is just a tool, and how and why AI art affects art itself.
Copyright (c) 2023 University of Maribor, University Press https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Problem ne-identitete kot problem okoljske etike?
The Non-identity Problem as a Problem of Environmental Ethics? In environmental ethics, the non-identity problem (NIP) is often considered to be a theoretical obstacle to climate change mitigation. It is based on the conflict between the intuition that some of our actions that affect future generations have moral value and the conclusion that because of their nature of influencing identity, it is difficult to point to the people who are harmed by them. In this article, I try to show that NIP does not pose such problems. First, I present the NIP in detail. Then, I analyse two approaches that question the premise that actions such as adopting one energy policy instead of another affect the identity of future generations. The first approach calls into question the notion of identity that this premise presupposes, while the second questions the notion of influencing identity. I also highlight some possible criticisms of both approaches and respond to them. In conclusion, I consider the practical implications of NIP for environmental measures and conclude that decisions concerning future generations are, from a practical point of view, analogous to decisions concerning contemporaries.
Chromatic Illumination Some cases of chromatic illumination are presented. The question about the importance of chromatic illumination for epistemology is then approached. There is a tension between the epistemic experiential evidence and the richness of morphological content, a tension dissolved through chromatic illumination. Understanding of chromatic illumination efficacy is facilitated through “iceberg epistemology.” Above the waterline there is occurrent conscious cognitive intentional content. Under the water surface, there is a plurality of nonconscious intentional contents, which are not represented in the overwater scene. They are rather appreciated there, through the mediation of their features, illuminating the mentioned scene and providing attitudinal direction of the overwater surface intentional content. The deepest area of iceberg epistemology is due to its unconscious part, providing causal efficacy to the overwater scene, being experienced in an outof-the-blue manner. We propose that the area of epistemic justification in belief formation follows normative diversity in the ethical appropriateness judgment: The difference between the good and the right may be compared to objective epistemic propositional justification and doxastic belief justification with the epistemic agent’s engagement.
Pripovedna umetnost in terapevtsko samospoznanje
Narrative Art and Therapeutic Self-knowledge In recent years, there have been debates in aesthetics and philosophy of art on the question of whether we can acquire knowledge about the world from works of art. However, little has been written about the effects of art on cultivating self-knowledge and self-development. While, for most of us, it seems obvious that art has these effects, little is known about how and why these effects occur. Addressing this issue is the main aim of this paper. The gist of the argument is that narrative art provides a unique opportunity to adopt a dual (first- and third-personal) perspective on the self, which has been argued recently by psychologists and philosophers of mind to be necessary for obtaining the kind of self-knowledge that leads to self-development and self-change, i.e., therapeutic self-knowledge.
The article deals with Wittgenstein’s understanding of ethics and aesthetics. The author presents the understanding of early Wittgenstein. He first explains Wittgenstein’s understanding of ethics, and afterwards, his view on the ethical importance of the aesthetic attitude. In this context, he explains in what sense we can talk about ethics as an ineffable (transcendental) condition. The following claim is explained: ethical tautologies are sacrosanct or even sacred, and their violation is tragic; changing the attitude towards the world changes the limits of the world, but not the facts of the world, and the world becomes a different world; ethical »sentences« are formal and absolute; ethics and aesthetics are one; an aesthetic attitude is the heart of a happy life; the ethics of early Wittgenstein is "egocentric" or solipsistic, eudaimonistic, has the characteristics of ethics as an art of life, and is of a personal nature, the ethics of the individual.
Kant and Schiller: Moral Law, Inclinations, and Virtue - Part I. Schiller – in contrast to Kant – relocated or situated beauty in the realm of practical reason in Kallias. This means that the principle of beauty is not constitutive but rather regulative, which, in other words, implies that everyone should perceive beauty in the object. According to Schiller, beauty is nothing but freedom in appearance. The question is which appearances deserve to be interpreted in this way? Schiller is convinced that we attribute freedom to those objects that are self-determining, those that act solely from themselves. His »objective« principle should be interpreted only in terms of »subjective universality«. In this sense, Schiller does not advance beyond Kant, who also supports »subjective universality«. The article compares the viewpoint of Schiller on one side and Kant on the other and concludes that, based on the analyzed topic, here Schiller was a step ahead of Kant, and it took Kant a few years to arrive at an almost identical position.
Copyright (c) 2023 University of Maribor, University Press https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Kripke o esencializmu izvora materialnih predmetov
Kripke on Material Origin Essentialism In the famous footnote 56 of Naming and Necessity, Kripke offers an argument for a claim that material origin is an essential property of objects. It soon became widely accepted in the literature that Kripke was attempting to derive material origin essentialism from his theory of naming alone. It was also argued that he had failed to do so. In this paper, I try to offer a new reading of Kripke’s argument. I argue that the text of footnote 56 should be read as an intuitive argument, based on the same set of intuitions about contingency and necessity that Kripke uses to defend his theory of rigid designators. It turns out that he can only argue for a weak form of material origin essentialism in this way, but I argue that Kripke’s vague formulation of the essentialism thesis is consistent with this weak form as well. First, I present the received view of Kripke’s argument and point out its flaws. I then summarize two approaches to completing the argument and show why they fail. Finally, I present my reading of Kripke’s argument.
Etika zastiranja in podrejenosti žensk v islamu
The Ethics of Veiling and Submission of Women in Islam The article focuses on Islamic ethics, the veiling of women in Islam, and the Western criticism of this phenomenon. It describes how Islamic ethics affect interpersonal relationships, whereby religious commandments and principles contribute to establishing orderly coexistence between people. Particular emphasis is placed on the veiling of women in the Islamic religion, where different interpretations and practices are manifested because of a complex cultural and religious framework. It analyses how the veiling of women stems from religious beliefs but, at the same time, faces diverse interpretations and understandings in different societies. The article deals with the free choice of female veiling and how it is defined and conditioned in different societies. The whole discussion raises questions about diversity, culture, gender equality, and freedom of religious choice, which are embedded in the complexity of the relationship between Islam, Western culture, and the veiling of women.
Kantovi argumenti za tezo »bit ni realni predikat«
Kant’s Grounds for the “Being is Not a Real Predicate” Thesis Influentially, Kant argued against the ontological proof by suggesting that being is not a real predicate. He developed the thesis in the Only Possible Argument and later in Critique of Pure Reason. But what are the reasons Kant gave for the thesis on being? The paper claims that there are four separate arguments embedded in Kant’s text: the descriptive argument, the argument from the thoroughly determined concept, the argument from comparison, and the identification argument. The respective advantages and sometimes surprisingly trivial flaws of the arguments are examined. The paper argues that the fourth argument appears to be the strongest one, even though the classic treatments of Kant’s thesis (Hegel, Heidegger, Barnes, Hintikka) concentrate on the first three.
“The General Structure of the World” in Tractatus: Some Thoughts on The Release of the New Translation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus I am debating the meaning of the so-called general structure of the world and the completely general (completely generalized) sentences in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico -Philosophicus. I find that any comparison of completely general sentences and elementary sentences corresponds to something impossible, namely wanting to say something meaningful about the world as a limited (and structured) whole. Does this mean that all statements about facts and the world, especially about all facts and the whole world, must be stopped? I don’t think so, because to stop talking about something doesn’t necessarily mean that we’ve transcended that speech, it’s also necessary to transcend any need or desire for such speech. According to Wittgenstein, this requires much more than the rejection of meaningless sentences, namely, it also requires reference to the meaning of the world (6.41) through the “transcendental” unity of the world and life (5.621).
On the Interpretations of Probability We often talk about probability in a completely everyday context and understand it intuitively. The problem arises when we try to define more precisely what probability is. The heterogeneity is reflected in the large number of different theoretical interpretations of probability. For a better understanding of the plurality of approaches, the first part of the paper provides a brief historical overview of the development of interpretations of probability and probability calculus. In the second part, various key interpretations are presented and critically evaluated: classical, logical, subjective, frequentist, and the propensity interpretation. The paper concludes with a brief analysis of how interpretations of probability are embedded in a broader philosophical context and highlights one of the open issues in this field: imprecise probabilities.
Synthetic Metaphysics The following article considers the connection between computation and metaphysics from two points of view. The first embraces a historical overview of authors who made key theoretical contributions to the modern understanding of computation. The second view elaborates on the concept of “synthetic metaphysics” which speculates that computation is a generalised form of every possible metaphysics. Limits of computation are limits of metaphysics so its most developed form cannot be analytical.